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The Aftermath of Merck: D&O Insecurity 
in the Security Fraud Arena 
 
Alexandra Russo* 
 
Introduction 
 
With millions of dollars to gain or lose, security fraud cases are hard 
fought and vehemently defended. To lose out on those millions over a 
discrepancy in timing is a disappointing and unfulfilling culmination to 
the long, hard road blazed by plaintiffs bringing Rule 10b-5 or § 10(b) 
security fraud actions.
1
 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) provides that in order to be 
timely a securities fraud complaint must be filed no more than “(1) 2 
years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 
years after such violation.” In the past, courts often applied the “inquiry 
notice” standard to security fraud cases, which “permitted defendants to 
successfully move to dismiss claims filed more than two years after 
sufficient ‘storm warning’ suggesting that fraud was possible, including 
alleged corrective disclosures.”2 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, this meant 
that the clock started ticking at “the point ‘at which a plaintiff 
possesse[d] a quantum of information sufficiently suggestive of 
wrongdoing.’”3 In the recent United States Supreme Court case, Merck & 
Co. v. Reynolds,
4
 plaintiffs have finally been given a boon. The Court 
decisively “rejected “inquiry notice” as having any weight on when the 
limitations period begins to run.”5 Rejecting the inquiry notice standard, 
 
       *   Pace Law School, expected J.D. May 2013. The Author would like to thank her 
parents, family, and friends who have and continue to support her through countless years 
of schooling. 
1. Evan Hill, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private 
Securities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2659, 2664-65 (2010). 
2. Michele Rose et al., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds: Time Runs out for Inquiry Notice, 
LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Jun. 15, 2010, at 2. 
3. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (2010) (quoting Brief for 
Petitioners at 20, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905), 2009 WL 2459589, at *20). 
4. 130 S. Ct. 1784. 
5. Melissa Maleske, High Court Rules for Plaintiffs in Merck v. Reynolds, 
INSIDECOUNSEL (July 2010), http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/July-
2010/Pages/High-court-rules-for-plaintiffs-in-Merck-v-Reynolds-.aspx. 
1
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the Court held in Merck that, “[t]he cause of action accrues only ‘(1) 
when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff would have discovered, “the facts constituting the violation”—
whichever comes first.’”6 Restricting “discovery” to the acquisition of 
actual knowledge of the fraud, or to when the fraud “would have [been] 
discovered,” renders a defendant’s demonstration that the statute of 
limitations had been running for long enough so as to time bar a 
plaintiff’s claim significantly more difficult. 
Through this ruling in Merck, “the Court [] significantly altered the 
availability of the statute of limitations defense for defendants on a 
motion to dismiss, and potentially opened the door for more cases 
pursuing stale claims.”7 The likely result is uncertainty for companies 
trying to evaluate what claims no longer need to be considered in terms 
of assessing their overall liability and their Director and Officer (D&O) 
liability insurance policies. Greater amounts of security fraud claims will 
lead to more frequent settlements for which insurance providers are 
responsible. As a result, rates and premiums charged to corporations for 
the provision of D&O liability insurance will undoubtedly increase. But 
will plaintiffs in security fraud suits truly use Merck as a crutch on which 
to lean in their crusade to reclaim the millions they believe to be 
rightfully theirs? 
This Comment will trace the history of Merck, culminating in the 
Supreme Court’s extension of the statute of limitations periods for 
private security fraud suits, and discuss the impact this holding will have 
on future security fraud litigation, both for investor-plaintiffs and issuer-
defendants. Part I will examine the facts and procedural history of 
Merck, which began in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey and ultimately reached the Supreme Court of the United 
States. This procedural background will illuminate the various 
interpretations existing prior to Merck regarding the events that trigger 
the statute of limitations period. Part II identifies the core regulations 
decidedly interpreted by the Supreme Court in Merck, their application to 
security fraud suits, and the extent of the existing circuit split. Part III 
extricates the essential holdings of Merck, namely the discovery 
 
6. Gov’t Regulatory & Criminal Investigations Grp., “Storm Warnings” Dissipate: 
SCOTUS Announces Test for Statute of Limitations in Securities Fraud Suits, SUBJECT TO 
INQUIRY BLOG [hereinafter Storm Warnings] (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/securities-litigation/storm-warnings-dissipate-scotus-
announces-test-for-statute-of-limitations-in-securities-fraud-suits/. 
7. Rose et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/6
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requirement of scienter as a fact constituting a violation, and the rejection 
of inquiry notice as “discovery” so as to trigger the statute of limitations. 
Finally, Part IV advances several potential implications for the decision, 
including increased numbers of private security fraud suits and difficulty 
for corporations in assessing risk for purposes of D&O liability 
insurance. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
Merck involved a securities fraud claim brought under § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by a group of Merck & Co.’s 
investors.
8
 The complaint was filed against Merck & Co. for 
misrepresentation of Merck’s pain-killing drug Vioxx.9 The investors 
“contend[ed] [] the company knowingly misrepresented the risk of using 
Vioxx, and that when the risks were disclosed the company’s share price 
fell.”10 
 
A.  Factual Background Leading Up to Suit 
 
In the mid-1990s, Merck developed the pain inhibiting anti-
inflammatory drug Vioxx.
11
 Vioxx, like other similar anti-inflammatory 
drugs such as aspirin and ibuprofen, stifles the body’s production of an 
enzyme called COX-2 (cyclooxygenase-2).
12
 Unlike these other anti-
inflammatory medications, however, “Vioxx does not inhibit production 
of a second enzyme called COX-1 (cyclooxygenase-1) . . . [which] plays 
a part in the functioning of the gastrointestinal tract and also in platelet 
aggregation (associated with blood clots).”13 Vioxx was approved for 
 
8. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1790. 
9. Andrew B. Weissman et al., What Does Merck & Co. v. Reynolds Mean for the 
Future of the Statute of Limitations Defense in Securities Fraud Litigation?, 
WILMERHALE (May 4, 2010), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/what_does_imerck__co_v_reynoldsi_mean_for_the_future_
of_the_statute_of_limitations_defense_in_securities_fraud_litigation_05-04-2010/. 
10. Kevin LaCroix, U.S. Supreme Court Allows Merck Vioxx Securities Suit to 
Proceed, THE D & O DIARY BLOG (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/04/articles/securities-litigation/us-supreme-court-
allows-merck-vioxx-securities-suit-to-proceed/. 
11. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1790. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
3
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prescription use by the FDA in 1999.
14
 
Shortly after FDA approval, the 2000 “VIGOR” study was 
conducted, analyzing and comparing the results and effects of Vioxx and 
other anti-inflammatory medications.
15
 Merck announced the results of 
the “VIGOR” study via press release, which stated that the study showed 
“persons taking Vioxx suffered fewer gastrointestinal side effects.”16 
However, the study also “found patients taking Vioxx suffered heart 
attacks at a higher rate than those taking a different painkiller.”17 Merck 
acknowledged the adverse cardiovascular effects of Vioxx in their press 
release, but suggested that “VIGOR’s troubling cardiovascular findings 
might be due to the absence of a benefit conferred by naproxen rather 
than due to a harm caused by Vioxx.”18 This focus on a lack of benefit in 
naproxen rather than a possible problem with Vioxx “later became 
known as the ‘naproxen hypothesis.’”19 
In May 2001, following Merck’s 2000 press release deemphasizing 
Vioxx’s cardiovascular risks, “a group of plaintiffs filed a products-
liability lawsuit against Merck, claiming that ‘Merck’s own research’ had 
demonstrated that ‘users of Vioxx were four times as likely to suffer 
heart attacks as compared to other less expensive, medications.’”20 
Shortly thereafter, “[i]n August 2001, the Journal of the American 
Medical Association wrote that the available data [on Vioxx] raised a 
‘cautionary flag.’”21 Again, “Merck issued a press release stating that it 
stood ‘behind the overall and cardiovascular safety profile . . . of 
Vioxx.’”22 
On September 21, 2001, a warning letter sent from the FDA to 
Merck was released to the public.
23
 This warning letter would later serve 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, WEIL, GOSTSHALL & MANGES (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://www.weil.com/merck-v-reynolds/; see also Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1791 (“But the 
study also revealed that approximately 4 out of every 1,000 participants who took Vioxx 
suffered heart attacks, compared to only 1 per 1,000 participants who took naproxen.”). 
18. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1791. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. (quoting J.A. Vol. II at 869, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905), 2009 WL 
2475437, at *869). 
21. Id. (quoting J.A. Vol. I at 332, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905), 2009 WL 
2475435, at *332). 
22. Id. (quoting J.A. Vol. I, supra note 21, at 437). 
23. Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/6
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as a focal point for the Supreme Court’s discussion on when the statute 
of limitations began to run against Merck’s investors. The 2001 warning 
letter required Merck to “send healthcare providers a corrective letter”24 
in light of the fact that, “Merck’s Vioxx marketing was ‘false, lacking in 
fair balance, or otherwise misleading’” with respect to cardiovascular 
risks.
25
 “Merck’s share price fell by 6.6% over several days” but 
rebounded by October 1, 2001.
26
 
Nearly two years later, in October of 2003, the Wall Street Journal 
published results of another Vioxx study that concluded “those given 
Vioxx for 30-to-90 days were 37% more likely to have suffered a heart 
attack than those given either a different painkiller or no painkiller at 
all.”27 One year after this article, on September 30, 2004, “Merck 
withdrew Vioxx from the market . . . [stating] a new study had found ‘an 
increased risk of confirmed cardiovascular events beginning after 18 
months of continuous therapy.’”28 A Merck representative characterized 
the results as “totally unexpected.”29 “Merck’s shares fell by 27% the 
same day.”30 
After Vioxx’s withdrawal from the market, the Wall Street Journal 
published another article discussing internal Merck communications. The 
November 1, 2004 article described “internal Merck e-mails and 
marketing materials as well as interviews with outside scientists 
show[ing] that the company fought forcefully for years to keep safety 
concerns from destroying the drug’s commercial prospects.”31 An early 
email from Merck’s head of research “said that the VIGOR “results 
showed that the cardiovascular events ‘are clearly there.’”32 Moreover, 
the email “also said that Merck had given its salespeople instructions to 
‘DODGE’ questions about Vioxx’s cardiovascular effects.”33 A 
complaint was filed by several investors on November 6, 2003 against 
Merck & Co. for the knowing misrepresentation of the pain-killing drug 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. (quoting J.A. Vol. I, supra note 21, at 339). 
26. Id. at 1791-92. 
27. Id. at 1792. 
28. Id. (quoting J.A. Vol. I, supra note 21, at 182). 
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. (J.A. Vol. I, supra note 21, at 189) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Id. (J.A. Vol. I, supra note 21, at 192). 
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5
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Vioxx.
34
 
In defense of the securities fraud claim, “Merck argued that the 
investors’ claims were invalid because they filed them more than two 
years after the investors should have been put on notice of any alleged 
fraud.”35 Merck asserted that several incidents occurring more than two 
years prior to the suit, including the 2001 Journal of the American 
Medical Association article, were sufficient to have “alerted the plaintiffs 
to a ‘possibility that Merck had knowingly misrepresented material 
facts.’”36 Principally, Merck contended the November 2001 public 
release of the September 2001 warning letter sent by the FDA to Merck 
describing “Vioxx’s marketing as ‘false, lacking fair balance, or 
otherwise misleading’ in light of conflicting views within the industry 
about whether Vioxx increased heart attack risk.”37 According to Merck, 
this should have put the plaintiffs on notice.
38
 
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
The District Court granted Merck’s motion for dismissal on the 
grounds that the investors’ claim was “barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations” provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1).39 The District Court 
found the public release of the FDA’s November 2001 letter to Merck 
sufficient to put to plaintiff on inquiry notice, therefore satisfying the 
statutory requirement of “discovery.”40 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the District Court’s ruling and found the investors’ complaint to 
be timely. In overruling the District Court, the Court of Appeals held 
that, while many of the actions “prior to filing constituted ‘storm 
warning,’ the events did not suggest scienter, and consequently did not 
put the plaintiffs on ‘inquiry notice.’”41 Critical to the holding was the 
Court’s finding that the March 2001 VIGOR study, the September 2001 
 
34. Weissman et al., supra note 9. 
35. Maleske, supra note 5. 
36. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Merck & Co., 
483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (D.N.J. 2007)). 
37. Weissman et al., supra note 9 (quoting Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1791). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793; see also id. 
41. LaCroix, supra note 10 (quoting In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d 150, 172 (3d Cir. 
2008)). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/6
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FDA warning letter, and Merck’s October 2001 response42 did not 
suggest that Merck acted with scienter, which is “a necessary element 
under § 10(b).”43 Absent scienter, the “storm warning” events of 2001, 
two years before the filing of the complaint, did not put the plaintiffs on 
inquiry notice of a potential § 10(b) violation so as to constitute 
“discovery” and trigger the statute of limitations.44 Merck filed for 
certiorari, challenging the Court of Appeals ruling that the investors’ 
action was not barred by § 1658(b)(1). 
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, effectively resolving the existing circuit split as to the 
interpretations of “discovery” and whether and when inquiry notice 
triggers the statute of limitations in securities fraud suits. The Supreme 
Court addressed and clarified three main points: the definition and scope 
of the word “discovery” in § 1658(b)(1);45 the element of scienter, and 
whether it is a “fact constituting the violation”;46 and the concept of 
“inquiry notice.”47 In its elucidating discussion of these areas, which had 
produced the most variation between circuits, the Supreme Court 
formulated the “essential principles for applying § 1658(b)(1) to 
securities fraud claims.”48 
 
II. Core Regulations At Issue In Merck 
 
A.  28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1), §10(b), and Rule 10b-5 
 
The Merck decision illustrates the modern necessity of a decisive 
ruling addressing circuit court splits on the statute of limitations in 
securities fraud suits. What once may have had little impact in the field 
now is of paramount importance “as plaintiff’s lawyers are . . . more 
commonly delaying in filing securities fraud cases.”49 28 U.S.C. § 
 
42. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1792. 
43. Weissman et al., supra note 9 (quoting In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 172). 
44. Id.; see also Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793 (stating: “unless a § 10(b) plaintiff can 
set forth facts in the complaint showing that it is ‘at least as likely as’ not that the 
defendant acted with the relevant knowledge or intent, the claim will fail.”). 
45. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793-97. 
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) (2002); see Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1797-98. 
47. See Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1798-99. 
48. Weissman et al., supra note 9. 
49. Patricia J. Villreal et al., The Supreme Court's Ruling in Merck Increases 
Uncertainty in Assessing Securities Fraud Litigation Risk, JONES DAY (Aug. 2010), 
7
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1658(b) provides that in order to be timely, a securities fraud complaint 
must be filed no more than “(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.”50 Actions 
brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are subject 
to the statutory limitations imposed by § 1658(b)(1).
51
 SEC Rule 10b-5, 
now codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, was enacted pursuant to §10(b) 
of the 1934 Act.
52
 Rule 10b-5, Employment of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Practices, provides that: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.
53
 
 
http://www.jonesday.com/supreme_court_ruling_in_merck/. 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b); see also Kasner et al., U.S. Supreme Court Addresses 
Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud Actions, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & 
FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (May 3, 2010), 
http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications2062_0.pdf. 
51. Weissman et al., supra note 9. 
52. Hill, supra note 1, at 2666 (“Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act is the foremost 
antifraud provision in U.S. securities law and is utilized through its primary mechanism 
of enforcement, SEC Rule 10b-5.”). 
53. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011); see Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010): 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/6
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SEC “Rule 10b-5 is the foremost investor protection tool available 
to those who have been cheated in the securities marketplace.”54 
Together, SEC Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act are the 
principal tools for plaintiffs in securities actions.
55
 These provisions are 
so frequently utilized for litigation “because they are ‘the so called 
“catchall” fraud provision[s]’ that broadly ‘prohibit the making of false 
and misleading statements or omissions in connection with the purchase 
and sale of securities.’”56 Since Rule 10b-5 is essentially the enforcement 
provision of § 10(b), “[p]laintiffs thus employ Rule 10b-5 in tandem with 
section 10(b) when alleging securities fraud.”57 
 
B.  Circuit Split 
 
Since Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) provide plaintiffs with an initial cause 
of action in securities fraud litigation, voluminous amounts of judicial 
discussion exist on the subject. However, neither rule provides “guidance 
as to how courts should evaluate claims alleging their violation.”58 
Moreover, the limitation guidelines of the regulations are equally as 
ambiguous.
59
 As such, “the elements required to prove section 10(b) and 
 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange— 
 
. . . . 
 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, or any securities- based swap agreement, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. 
 
Id. § 78j(a)(2)(b). 
54. Hill, supra note 1, at 2661. 
55. Id. at 2662. 
56. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683). 
57. Id. at 2667. 
58. Id. at 2668. 
59. See Michael A. Collora & David M. Osborne, Statute of Limitations and 
Eligibility Issues in Securities Arbitration, COLLORA LLP, 
http://www.collorallp.com/law-articles/securities/arbitration-statute-limitations-
eligibility.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
9
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Rule 10b-5 violations are almost entirely judicially constructed.”60 In the 
absence of a governing interpretation, “the circuit courts relied on the 
Rules of Decision Act (28 U.S.C. § 1652) to borrow various limitations 
from analogous statutes of repose . . . [which] created conflict, confusion, 
unfairness, and an onslaught of litigation.”61 In an effort to standardize 
statute of limitation rulings, the Supreme Court held that “causes of 
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be brought within one 
year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within 
three years after the violation actually occurred.”62 In 2002, however, 
federal legislation formally established the official statute of limitations 
for securities fraud suits. Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
“which extended the statute of limitations for claims of securities fraud, 
deceit or manipulation to the earlier of two years after the discovery of 
the facts constituting the violation or five years after such violation.”63 
The provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley presently govern statute of limitation 
periods for security fraud suits.
64
 
Determining the triggering event for the two-year statute of 
limitations period has proven complicated. The precise events starting 
the two-year period are difficult to establish because “discovery of the 
facts constituting the violation is a fluid concept.”65 As such, circuit 
courts have created various definitions of “discovery,” and therefore 
apply different standards to determine when the statute of limitations 
begins to run. Specifically, the discrepancies arise over what acts 
constitute “storm warnings” or “inquiry notice” sufficient to state that the 
plaintiff is privy to information and knowledge that rise to the level of 
“discovery.” 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit defined 
“inquiry notice” as “the term used for knowledge of facts that would lead 
a reasonable person to begin investigating the possibility that his legal 
 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350, 360 (1991)). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . extend[s] the statute of limitations for 
securities claims . . . .”); see also Glossary of Terms, PARKER WAICHMAN LLP, 
http://www.statutes-of-limitations.com/content/glossary-of-terms (last visited Nov. 4, 
2011) (“§ 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . sets the statute of limitations for private 
security fraud cases . . . .”). 
65. Collora & Osborne, supra note 59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/6
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rights had been infringed.”66 That court has held that, “the clock begins 
running when information puts plaintiffs on ‘inquiry notice’ of the need 
for further investigation into the possibility that the plaintiff’s legal rights 
have been infringed.”67 In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that “‘duty of inquiry’ arises once 
‘circumstances would suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the 
probability that she had been defrauded.’”68 The Second Circuit therefore 
differs in its application of “inquiry notice” from the Eleventh Circuit in 
that it “applied a modified ‘inquiry notice’ rule—running the clock at the 
point of inquiry notice if a plaintiff fails to investigate, but, if an 
investigation is conducted, starting the clock at the time a reasonable 
plaintiff should have discovered the facts.”69 Generally, the inquiry 
notice standards seems to have the common element that, at least, “the 
plaintiff has been presented with evidence suggesting the possibility of 
fraud.”70 
Applying yet another variation of the inquiry notice standard, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit introduces the 
concept of interpreting the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense. The Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he facts constituting such 
notice must be sufficien[t] . . . to incite the victim to investigate [and] to 
enable him to tie up any loose ends and complete the investigation in 
time to file a timely suit.”71 The court is careful not to focus solely on the 
statute of limitations, which can “precipitate premature and groundless 
suits, as plaintiffs rush to beat the deadline without being able to obtain 
good evidence of fraud.”72 While applying the inquiry notice standard, 
the Seventh Circuit considers that the “statute of limitations bar is an 
 
66. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (2010) (quoting Franze v. 
Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
67. Villareal et al., supra note 49. 
68. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1797 (quoting Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 
(2d Cir. 1993)). 
69. Villareal et al., supra note 49. 
70. Collora & Osborne, supra note 59 (quoting Harner v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 
Inc., Nos. 92-1353, 92-1910, 1994 WL 49487135, at *4 (6th Cir. 1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 
120 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Inquiry notice exists when the victim is aware of 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to investigate and consequently acquire actual 
knowledge of the defendant’s misrepresentations.”); see also Villareal et al., supra note 
49. 
71. Fujisawa Pharm Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1997). 
72. Law v. Medco Research, 113 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1997).  
11
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affirmative defense that must be proven by the defendant.”73 This burden 
of proof placed on the defendants requires establishment that “the statute 
of limitations has run, . . . [and] that a reasonably diligent investor would 
have brought suit before [the current] suit was actually filed.”74 The 
possibility for conflicting results among circuit courts, even within the 
inquiry notice standard alone, points to the urgency of the Supreme 
Court’s decisive ruling in Merck. 
 
III.  Essential Holdings of Merck 
 
A.  Discovery 
 
In Merck, the Supreme Court first determined whether the word 
“discovery” is limited “to a plaintiffs’ actual discovery of certain 
facts,”75 or if it also applies to “the facts that a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff would have discovered.”76 The Court examined legislative 
history and prior case law interpreting “discovery,” and determined “that 
the word ‘discovery’ in the statute includes not only the actual discovery 
of the facts constituting the violation, but also the constructive discovery 
of such facts.”77 Due to the nature of fraud, which in itself may impede a 
potential plaintiff from actually discovering it by virtue of the 
“defendant’s deceptive conduct,”78 courts have recognized for more than 
a century “that ‘[f]raud is deemed to be discovered . . . when, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered.’”79 
Therefore, allowing this “constructive discovery (the ‘reasonably diligent 
plaintiff’ standard) [i]s consistent with the statute’s language, which was 
modeled on language used in prior cases that recognized constructive 
discovery.”80 
 
73. Collora & Osborne, supra note 59. 
74. Medco, 113 F.3d at 786. 
75. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793 (emphasis in original). 
76. Id. 
77. Michael P. Carroll et al., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds: U.S. Supreme Court 
Clarifies Statute of Limitations in Securities Fraud Cases, DAVIS POLK (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7a565c12-2620-4e55-94b5-
04ef3ca7efb7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/56bc2fce-3e43-4ba5-80c2-
07b31461e37d/042810_Merck.html (emphasis in original). 
78. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793. 
79. Id. at 1794 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 H. WOOD, LIMITATIONS OF 
ACTIONS § 276b(11) (4th ed. 1916)). 
80. Weissman et al., supra note 9. 
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B.  Scienter 
 
Once it established that the “discovery requirement includes 
constructive discovery,” the Court moved on to a discussion of scienter, 
and whether scienter is a “fact[] constituting the violation”81 so as to be 
“discovered.” The statute of limitations provided for in § 1658(b)(1) 
stipulates “that the limitations period does not begin to run until 
‘discovery of the facts constituting the violation.’”82 The Court held that 
scienter, for § 10(b) actions, “refers to ‘a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,’”83 and is undoubtedly a “fact,”84 that 
“‘constitut[es]’ an important and necessary element of a § 10(b) 
‘violation.’”85 If scienter were not a fact constituting the violation that 
would be discovered to trigger the running of the statute of limitations, as 
“long as a defendant concealed for two years that he made a 
misstatement with an intent to deceive, the limitations period would 
expire before the plaintiff had actually ‘discover[ed]’ the fraud.”86 
Therefore, it would cut against the policy reasons for creating these 
“heightened pleading requirements for the scienter element of § 10(b) 
fraud cases”87 to allow the statute of limitations to begin running before a 
plaintiff uncovered a defendant’s intentional deception; “it would be 
unfair if the limitations period began before a plaintiff discovered facts 
suggesting deliberate intent to deceive.”88 
 
C.  Inquiry Notice 
 
Finally, the Court turned to a discussion of the applicability and 
functionality of “inquiry notice” in § 10(b) claims. Merck argued that the 
statute of limitations began to run prior to November 2001 because the 
 
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) (2002). 
82. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1658(b)(1)). 
83. Id. at 1796 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 
(1976)). 
84. Id. at 1796 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. (alteration in original). 
87. Id. 
88. Villareal et al., supra note 49. 
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plaintiffs were on “inquiry notice.”89 In their argument, Merck used 
“‘inquiry notice’ to refer to the point ‘at which a plaintiff possesses a 
quantum of information sufficiently suggestive of wrongdoing that he 
should conduct a further inquiry.’”90 The Court accepted this general 
understanding of the term, and characterized “inquiry notice” as “the 
point where the facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to 
investigate further.”91 However, “[t]he Court observed that the point in 
time at which a plaintiff is placed on inquiry notice does not necessarily 
coincide with when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered 
‘facts constituting the violation,’ as required by the statute.”92 Therefore, 
the Court refused to accept Merck’s argument on the basis that the 
language of the statute demands the statute run upon “discovery,” not 
before.
93
 
While “inquiry notice” might, and should, induce a plaintiff to delve 
deeper into an investigation of wrongdoing, the wrongdoing is not yet 
“discovered.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) explicitly states that the limitations 
period begins running at the time of “discovery.” As such, there is “no 
indication that the limitations period should occur at some earlier 
moment before ‘discovery’” and so the Court held that it could not 
accept “inquiry notice” as an event triggering the statute of limitations 
alone.
94
 If, however, a plaintiff is put on “inquiry notice” and then 
declines further investigation, he finds no solace in the law. The 
inclusion of an objective standard, the reasonable diligent plaintiff, in the 
definition of inquiry notice, ensures that the statute of limitations works 
against “plaintiffs who fail to investigate once on ‘inquiry notice.’”95 The 
applicable two-year statute of limitations in § 1658(b)(1) “lapses two 
years after a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the 
necessary facts.”96 The Court concluded that, although terms like 
“inquiry notice” and “storm warnings” may have utility in identifying “a 
time when the facts would have prompted a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
 
89. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1797. 
90. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 20, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905), 
2009 WL 2459589, at *20). 
91. Id. 
92. Weissman et al., supra note 9. 
93. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1797. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1798. 
96. Id. 
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to begin investigating,”97 “the ‘discovery’ of facts that put a plaintiff on 
‘inquiry notice’ does not automatically begin the running of the 
limitations period.”98 
 
IV. Securities Fraud Litigation Post-Merck 
 
A change in the statute of limitations provisions for securities fraud 
suits would have likely held little importance in the past. Few cases 
would have run the risk of becoming time barred since “plaintiff lawyers 
. . . traditionally ‘raced to the courthouse’ following a large drop in a 
company’s stock price.”99 This expeditious filing of securities fraud 
complaints rendered statute of limitation concerns substantially 
irrelevant. In recent years, however, there has been a significant increase 
in the number of security fraud cases being filed at a delayed rate. 
“[S]ince the second half of 2009, there have been an increasing number 
of case filings in which the filing date has come well after the proposed 
class period cutoff date.”100 This figure “includes a sharp increase in 
claims filed a year or later after the close of the alleged class period.”101 
As such, the reasonable expectation following Merck is the emergence of 
a large number of otherwise “stale” securities fraud cases relying on the 
more relaxed statute of limitations interpretation for Rule 10b-5 claims. 
Coupled with the recent trend towards delayed filings, the ruling in 
Merck that “Section 10(b) is not triggered until the claimants have, or 
with reasonable diligence could have had, knowledge of the facts 
constituting the violation, including in particular facts constituting 
scienter”102 will likely herald a deluge of securities claims previously 
time-barred; however, few cases have been filed in reliance on Merck 
until recently.
103
 
 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Villareal et al., supra note 49. 
100. LaCroix, supra note 10. 
101. Villareal et al., supra note 49 (“For example, in February 2010, a securities 
fraud claim was filed against Nokia Corporation almost 18 months after the end of the 
alleged class period.”). 
102. Kevin LaCroix, When is a Securities Suit Stale?, THE D & O DIARY BLOG 
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/09/articles/securities-litigation/when-
is-a-securities-suit-stale/. 
103. Id. 
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A.  D&O Liability 
 
The repercussions of Merck will also be felt in the area of D&O 
liability and insurance. D&O insurance “provides financial protection for 
the directors and officers of [a] company in the event [it is] sued in 
conjunction with the performance of [its] duties as they relate to the 
company.”104 As a result of a company’s D&O liability insurance policy, 
“the insurance company has agreed to stand in the shoes of its allegedly 
wrongdoing insureds to the full extent of its policy’s limits of 
liability.”105 Since the limits of the policy will determine the level of 
coverage the directors and officers are entitled to, “[t]he key to properly 
structuring a D&O insurance and corporate indemnification program is 
recognizing the activities that pose the greatest threat of liability to 
directors and officers . . . [such as] securities fraud class action 
lawsuits.”106 With a greater number of security fraud actions now 
considered timely under the Merck standard, directors and officers will 
face a higher potential for having claims brought against them. 
Underwriters and insurance providers must reevaluate policies 
given that a greater number of securities fraud claims may now be 
brought against corporations (and its directors and officers). This 
“uncertainty about when events in the past [are] so long gone that 
companies can be sure that they are ‘out of the woods’ about past 
problems” presents considerable difficulty to insurance policy 
underwriters trying to assess risk levels.
107
 Given that “securities fraud 
class actions pose the greatest potential danger of monetary liability to 
directors and officers,” insurers will have to look further into a 
company’s past to determine the likelihood of such actions being 
brought, and thus adjust the coverage and rates accordingly.
108
 This 
practice will prove particularly problematic for companies that have 
 
104. Directors & Officers Insurance, INSUREPRO, 
http://www.insurepro.net/pdf/directorsandofficers.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
105. John H. Mathias, Jr. & Timothy W. Burns, Conserving D&O Insurance 
Policies in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Common Interest of Policyholders and 
Institutional Shareholder Claimants, 14 COVERAGE 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252%5C8
21%5CConserving_D&O_Insurance_Policies.PDF. 
106. Francis G. Coleman, Complete Guide to D&O Insurance: Special Report Risk 
and Liability, NACD DIRECTORSHIP (June 1, 2007), 
http://www.directorship.com/complete-guide-to-do-insurance/. 
107. LaCroix, supra note 102. 
108. Coleman, supra note 106. 
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faced issues in the past; if cases in reliance on Merck prevail, 
“underwriters will be compelled to extend their scrutiny of a particular 
company far into the past, with no sure way of knowing how far back is 
far enough.”109 As a result, sticky situations that would otherwise have 
been insulated from fraud claims may now be included when 
underwriters assess the risk associated with that particular entity. Higher 
premiums and narrower scopes of D&O liability policies for securities 
fraud action seem likely outcomes as a result of Merck. 
Yet most, if not all, D&O liability insurance policies contain a fraud 
exclusion provision.
110
 These provisions of “D&O policies, which have a 
primary purpose of protecting directors and officers against securities 
fraud lawsuits, provide no coverage if the director, the officer, or the 
company is found liable in a final judgment for deliberate securities 
fraud.”111 These policies only deny coverage “if there were a final 
adjudication that fraud was indeed committed in the underlying securities 
fraud litigation.”112 Therefore, if it is never formally decreed in court that 
the plaintiffs committed fraud, the fraud exclusion provision is 
inapplicable. “In other words, if the securities fraud case were to settle, 
the exclusion would not apply.”113 Given the expensive nature of 
securities fraud suits, the ability to stay within the confines of a liability 
policy provides a tremendous incentive for companies to settle outside of 
court. As a result of such fraud exclusion provisions in D&O insurance 
policies, “there appears to have been only one state and three federal 
securities lawsuits against directors and officers to have gone to trial in 
the last thirteen years.”114 Given this boon to plaintiffs (that they 
theoretically are given a larger window in which to file securities fraud 
claims), it would seem that Merck will induce a greater number of 
potential frivolous lawsuits to be filed in hopes of a settlement. 
That “[t]o prevail at trial is to risk forfeiture of the D&O insurance 
proceeds,” security fraud defendants are unlikely to brave the harrows of 
a full trial.
115
 Certainly, “[t]he amount and scope of coverage may lead to 
significant changes in litigation strategy” on the part of corporate 
 
109. LaCroix, supra note 102. 
110. Coleman, supra note 106. 
111. Mathias & Burns, supra note 105. 
112. Coleman, supra note 106. 
113. Id. 
114. Mathias & Burns, supra note 105. 
115. Id. 
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defendants.
116
 Not only do the intricacies of D&O liability promote 
settlement, the effects of Merck do as well. As a result of the Court’s 
rejection of the inquiry notice standard, “it will no longer be sufficient 
for defense counsel to simply argue for the existence of ‘storm warnings’ 
or to make common law-like ‘inquiry notice’ arguments.”117 Rather than 
continuously assert motions to dismiss, Merck forces “defense counsel . . 
. to prove at what point a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have 
discovered ‘the facts constituting the violation’—including scienter”118 
so as to warrant dismissal on statute of limitations grounds; “the days of 
merely arguing that a plaintiff could see the storm approaching and had a 
duty to investigate further are over.”119 
 
B.  Litigation Concerns 
 
The most likely result of Merck’s plaintiff-friendly language is that 
“the number of § 10(b) complaints dismissed under the two-year statute 
of limitations will likely fall.”120 Since “the Court limited the 
circumstances in which defendants may avail themselves of a statute of 
limitations defense in cases involving alleged misstatements that are 
more than 2 years old,” defendants will either be forced to settle more 
often or take their chances in the courts.
121
 However, with a larger 
number of settlements on their plate, companies may take their chances 
in the courtroom. Since either actual or constructive notice (what facts a 
“reasonably diligent plaintiff” would have discovered) is acceptable 
under the Merck standard, “motions to dismiss on statute of limitations 
grounds will likely continue to be litigated based on the objective facts in 
the public record.”122 In any of the above scenarios, Merck will prove 
costly for companies faced with securities fraud claims; either defense 
costs, settlement fees or downright judgments, Merck serves as a 
powerful weapon sheathed in the holsters of Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) 
plaintiffs. 
 
116. Id. 
117. Storm Warnings, supra note 6. 
118. Id. (“In a Section 10(b) case, constructive knowledge of facts constituting a 
misstatement or omission, without more, may not be sufficient to begin the running of the 
statute.”). 
119. Id. 
120. Weissman et al., supra note 9. 
121. Carroll et al., supra note 77. 
122. Id. 
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The results of this increased burden of proof on defendants will 
often mean that the accrual date of the statute of limitations could be 
pushed out.
123
 The “elevated hurdle for plaintiffs” set out in Merck 
establishes that alleging a defendant’s scienter creates a heightened 
pleading standard.
124
 Ultimately, the ruling is plaintiff-friendly in that 
“the rejection of the inquiry notice standard and the requirement of facts 
establishing scienter makes it more difficult to trigger the limitations 
period in the first instance.”125 Without such a restrictive time limit, 
plaintiff’s lawyers will undoubtedly have more time to prepare cases, and 
more cases will be viable for trial.
126
 While an extended time period for 
filing security fraud claims may seem positive, many other problems are 
likely to arise. 
Plaintiffs, less vulnerable to the motion to dismiss, may exacerbate 
the trend in delayed filings discussed earlier and sit even longer on 
potential suits.
127
 Intentional delays in filing could have several added 
benefits to security fraud plaintiffs, such as to “increase the settlement 
value of their claims” or, if the plaintiffs “believe the company’s stock 
prices will decline, in an effort to claim larger losses and, therefore, 
receive increased settlements or damage awards.”128 While this could 
prove problematic for corporations because they will be faced with larger 
settlement demands and trumped-up loss charges, the ruling in Merck 
will not have such widespread effects as anticipated. 
Firstly, the scope and application of Merck will not leave defendants 
without recourse. If a “plaintiff’s complaint itself sets forth facts showing 
that the elements of the violation . . . occurred and were knowable more 
than two years prior to filing,” defendants will likely be successful in 
asserting a motion to dismiss.
129
 Since constructive notice also triggers 
the limitations period, “asserting the statute of limitations defense at the 
 
123. Id. 
124. Maleske, supra note 5. 
125. Rose et al., supra note 2. 
126. Ralphe V. De Martino & Jennifer H. Unhoch, United States: U.S. Supreme 
Court Addresses the Statute of Limitations for Private Federal Securities Fraud Claims, 
MONDAQ (May 24, 2010), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=101200 (“The Merck decision 
is likely to result in a reduction of the number of private securities fraud cases dismissed 
on statute of limitations grounds, and plaintiff lawyers will arguably have more time to 
commence securities fraud actions.”). 
127. See LaCroix, supra note 10. 
128. De Martino & Unhoch, supra note 126. 
129. Rose et al., supra note 2. 
19
RUSSO_Formatted_Finalv3 4/11/2012  7:38 PM 
236 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
pleading stage based upon documents that may be considered by the 
court on judicial notice (i.e., documents incorporated in to the complaint 
and public filings) is not foreclosed.”130 Secondly, “the opinion appears 
to reinforce the stringency of the requirement to plead facts that support 
‘a strong inference’ of scienter with particularity under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).”131 Plaintiffs may 
have greater difficulty pleading facts (before discovery) that demonstrate 
the requisite scienter on the part of the defendant. 
While clearly a victory for plaintiffs, the ruling in Merck may prove 
less overreaching than anticipated. As a matter of application, the ruling 
may not be completely detrimental to “corporate defendants in Section 
10(b) private securities class actions [since] the impact of Merck will 
likely be narrow within the securities fraud realm due to the case’s novel 
circumstances.”132 Though the Supreme Court has settled a badly divided 
circuit split on the issue of “discovery” for security fraud suits, there are 
still many other cases that will not fall into the mold of Merck so as to be 
bound by the holding. Corporate defendants, stripped somewhat of their 
powerful motion to dismiss, will undoubtedly fight to differentiate each 
case from Merck. In the absence of a similar set of factual circumstances, 
lower courts may be reluctant to stick closely to Merck and side 
supportively with defendants. Overall, however, the impact of Merck will 
be felt—it just remains to be seen how much. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Merck’s essential holdings will certainly play a significant role in 
the future of securities law and litigation. The Court’s rejection of 
“Merck’s argument that Sarbanes-Oxley does not require ‘discovery’ of 
scienter-related facts, holding that scienter is ‘assuredly a “fact,”‘ and 
that scienter is an important and necessary element of a Section 10(b) 
claim” changes the playing field for plaintiffs and defendants alike in 
 
130. Id. 
131. Carroll et al., supra note 77 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2010), 
which requires plaintiff to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”). 
132. Maleske, supra note 5; see also Barry J. Mandel & Joseph D. Edmondson, Jr., 
Predicting SCOTUS In Merck v. Reynolds, LAW360.COM (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/6826/SCOTUSlaw360.pd
f (“First, it is reasonable to expect [in Merck] that the holding in this case will be 
narrowly confined to fraud-on-the-market cases, as this was the case presented.”). 
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security fraud cases.
133
 This determination instructs lower courts that 
notice can be both actual and constructive,
134
 and that “notice . . . of facts 
showing a mere misstatement or omission will not start the running of 
the statute of limitations.”135 The ruling of scienter as a fact has strong 
policy support given “that it would be unfair if the limitations period 
began before a plaintiff discovered facts suggesting deliberate intent to 
deceive.”136 These determinations will enable plaintiffs to extend the 
period in which they have to file claims for security fraud given the more 
expansive approach the Supreme Court adopted. Plaintiffs will have a 
less difficult time showing they have neither actual nor constructive 
knowledge of facts constituting “discovery,” and defendants will have a 
more difficult time showing that the plaintiffs should have discovered the 
facts. As a result, there should be a greater number of cases filed in 
response to Merck. Though the case’s holding may have a narrow 
application, it still provides plaintiffs with a useful tool in the security 
fraud arena. When a powerful tool is provided, it is usually taken 
advantage of; the trend in delayed filing will likely increase as plaintiffs 
use Merck to strategize and maximize the results of their efforts. 
The likely increase in the number of cases now capable of being 
brought for security fraud as a result of Merck’s “discovery” definition 
will impact D&O liability the greatest. Companies purchasing security 
fraud liability “expect that D&O insurers will be closely involved in 
providing the financial resources for resolving big damages securities 
fraud litigation, even though it involves allegations of serious 
wrongdoing.”137 In order for insurance providers to continue to meet 
such expectations, they need to have the ability to accurately determine a 
given entity’s risk level. Under the new Merck standards, it will be very 
difficult for companies to create an accurate portrait of their liability 
landscape. Instances or occurrences of a potentially problematic nature 
will become red flagged and be considered “risky” for the purposes of 
determining the level of security fraud coverage needed. Consequently, 
the rates and premiums paid by companies in order to maintain these 
insurance policies will rise significantly. Moreover, insurance policies 
may be crafted that are ultimately inadequate to compensate for “stale” 
 
133. Storm Warnings, supra note 6. 
134. Carroll et al., supra note 77. 
135. Storm Warnings, supra note 6. 
136. Villareal et al., supra note 49. 
137. Mathias & Burns, supra note 105. 
21
RUSSO_Formatted_Finalv3 4/11/2012  7:38 PM 
238 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
claims not reinvigorated under Merck’s “discovery” analysis. 
Whether on the litigation end or the D&O liability end, Merck is 
now the governing precedent on security fraud cases. Lower courts have 
yet to conform or rebel against the Supreme Court’s resolution of the 
fractured circuit split, but it will be interesting to see whether there can 
be resolution among the varying interpretations that have existed among 
the circuits for so long. Lower courts may use the narrowly tailored 
application of Merck to their advantage and avoid departing from a 
standard of “discovery” analysis they prefer. Whether Merck changes 
litigation outcomes at any stage of adjudication is uncertain; the impact 
on D&O liability, however, is clear. As long as there are millions of 
dollars to be gained and lost from security fraud litigation, whoever is 
suffering damages will be sure to mitigate. 
 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/6
